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automotive,	 electro-mechanical,	 electricity	 and	 retail	 trade	 sectors	 have	











&	 security	 of	 supply,	German	 companies	 appreciate	 the	 new	 elements	 of	













thus	difficult	 to	make	significant	margins	and	escape	 from	the	 so-called	
middle	income	trap.










































•	 An	 important	prerequisite	 for	 improving	 cooperation	between	Germany	











the	 cohesion	policy	 is	 only	a	way	of	financing	 the	poorer	member	 states	
which	does	not	guarantee	Germany	any	economic	benefits.	
•	 The	 effects	 of	 the	 possible	 breakup	 of	 the	 Schengen	 area	 are	 difficult	 to	




























































Germany	 is	 Central	 Europe’s	 most	 important	 economic	 partner,	 and	 in	 re-




































and	regional	 (Länder)	 levels,	 as	well	as	embassies,	business	associations,	 re-
search	institutes,	chambers	of	commerce	and	foreign	investment	agencies	in	
the	Czech	Republic,	Poland,	Hungary	and	Slovakia.	This	information	has	been	


























I. The advanTages of cenTral europe  
from The perspecTIve of germany
In	 recent	 years,	 the	 region	 of	 Central	 Europe	 has	 continued	 its	 quite	 rapid	





















to	 Asia.	 After	 entering	 the	 euro-zone,	 Germany’s	 economic	 situation	 was	
evaluated	very	critically	both	at	home	and	abroad.	The	economy	remained	
stagnant	 for	 several	 years	 after	 German	 reunification.	 Unemployment	 in	
















































risen	 considerably	 in	 previous	 years,	 but	 also	 increased	 efficiency	 thanks	
to	the	factories’	high	productivity	and	the	improving	qualifications	of	local	
workers.	




























































































After	 2007,	 economic	 relations	 between	Germany	 and	Central	 Europe	were	
boosted	by	the	process	of	modernisation,	which	was	also	financed	by	the	EU’s	
cohesion	 policy.	 The	 V4	 countries	were	 some	 of	 the	 biggest	 beneficiaries	 of	
































































































































II. The developmenT of Trade beTween 
germany and The v4
In	recent	years,	the	V4	group	has	become	one	of	Germany’s	key	trade	partners,	















1. The role of central europe as a key trading partner for germany
In	the	last	decade,	the	role	of	foreign	trade	in	the	German	economy	has	grown	
extremely	rapidly.	Since	2007,	 the	V4	countries	 taken	 together	have	become	




most	 important	 sources	 of	 economic	 growth,	 especially	 since	 internal	 con-
sumption	has	not	proven	to	be	an	important	driver	of	economic	development.	
In	 the	 years	 2004-8,	 Germany’s	 turnover	 rose	 very	 dynamically,	 thanks	 to	
good	times	in	the	euro-zone	and	on	the	emerging	markets.	The	biggest	reces-
sion	 in	post-war	German	history	 in	2009,	when	GDP	fell	by	5%,	did	not	 lead	
to	a	prolonged	weakening	of	growth	in	Germany.	Despite	the	initial	collapse	






























that	 of	 second-ranked	China	 (US$150	billion)	 and	almost	 three	 times	higher	
than	third-ranked	Saudi	Arabia	(US$100	billion)6.	The	scale	of	the	success	of	
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poland 15.7 87.5 12 8 457% +	4
czech republic 17.5 70.4 11 11 302% 0
hungary 12.2 41.9 15 14 243% +	1
slovakia 7.3 24.1 21 20 230% +	1
germany’s trade 665 1124     69%  
source:	Federal	Statistical	Office
From	the	list	of	Germany’s	most	important	trading	partners,	we	can	see	that	
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to	25%	 for	 the	V4	group	as	a	whole.	During	 the	 same	period,	 the	 total	par-
ticipation	of	the	V4	states	in	Germany’s	foreign	trade	rose	from	7.9%	to	20%.	
Deeper	analysis	allows	us	to	conclude	that	the	individual	V4	countries	have	
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many,	although	this	has	fallen	 in	recent	years,	 to	 the	 level	of	€8	billion.	The	
other	V4	countries,	after	several	years	of	relative	stability,	have	begun	experi-
encing	a	surplus	in	trade	with	Germany.	However,	these	results	require	some	



































3. risks associated with the v4’s dependence on trade with germany
The	trade	structures	of	both	Germany	and	the	V4	states	are	similar.	Certain	

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The	cooperation	between	 the	V4	countries	and	Germany	poses	 the	 risk	 that	
the	V4	states	will	become	stuck	in	the	group	of	countries	with	a	medium	level	















































Secondly,	 the	development	of	 the	V4	 states’	 economic	 cooperation	with	Ger-























































































































































































































































By	analysing	balance	of	 secondary	 income,	which	show	what	 the	balance	of	




















































































ten	 years,	 deeming	 the	 developed	 countries	 to	 be	more	 attractive	 locations.	
China	and	India	are	also	more	attractive	in	this	respect;	because	they	are	such	
large	and	geographically	remote	markets,	more	and	more	German	companies	
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3. The investment climate in the v4 countries from the perspective 
of german investors
Over	the	past	two	years,	the	investment	attractiveness	of	the	V4	countries	has	
increased	 considerably	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 German	 investors.	 In	 2014	 Poland	 ob-
tained	the	best	values	of	specific	indicators	for	investment	attractiveness.	Data	











































































































































There	have	 been	 clear	 changes	with	 respect	 to	German	 investors’	 attitude	
towards	plans	 to	 introduce	 the	euro	 in	 those	 countries	of	 the	V4	which	do	
not	 yet	 use	 it.	 Support	 for	 this	 issue	 among	German	 companies	 has	 fallen	
significantly	in	the	Czech	Republic,	Poland	and	Hungary	to	similar	degrees,	
probably	as	a	result	of	the	crisis	in	the	monetary	union;	nevertheless,	a	slight	
majority	still	supports	 the	 introduction	of	 the	single	currency.	Whereas	 in	
2009	about	90%	of	interviewees	believed	the	adoption	of	the	euro	would	be	
beneficial	for	their	companies,	in	2014	the	percentage	was	only	slightly	more	




















































































































cally	 than	Poland	with	regard	to	 the	quality	of	 infrastructure.	The	other	V4	





























Iv.  The polITIcal prospecTs for economIc 
cooperaTIon
In	recent	years,	Germany’s	good	economic	performance	has	afforded	it	a	priv-
































































euro-zone	 banks	 from	 bankruptcy	 should	 not	 be	 associated	 with	 subsidis-
ing	 them,	which	could	effectively	mean	giving	 them	unauthorised	state	aid,	
thus	making	it	easier	for	them	to	compete	on	the	V4	countries’	markets.	Such	








southern	 and	northern	 EU	 countries	 seems	 to	 have	 become	 settled,	 at	 least	
in	the	medium	term,	as	economic	interests	become	conditional	upon	levels	of	
public	debt.	Although	the	crisis	in	the	euro-zone	has	now	lasted	for	some	years,	
Germany’s	budgetary	 situation	has	 improved	 significantly,	 and	 it	now	more	
closely	resembles	that	of	the	countries	of	Central	Europe	rather	than	those	of	
the	south.	Germany	is	also	aware	that	the	European	Commission,	led	by	Jean-
-Claude	 Juncker,	plays	 the	role	of	a	political	actor,	and	not	simply	 that	of	an	
independent	guardian	of	the	treaties	which	is	supposed	to	oversee	fiscal	dis-
cipline	within	the	EU.	It	cannot	be	ruled	out	that	the	governments	of	France,	
























































































































































The InvolvemenT of german companIes In selecTed 
secTors In The member sTaTes of The vIsegrad group


















guished	by	 the	share	of	parts	manufactured	abroad	 throughout	 the	produc-
tion.	The	companies	which	manufacture	most	parts	overseas	are	Volkswagen	
(79%),	then	Audi	(53%),	Daimler	(40%)	and	least	of	all	BMW	(36%)22.	







































































































Merkel	weighed	 in	on	 the	matter.	Many	car	 companies	with	headquarters	 in	
Germany	deliberately	chose	a	strategy	of	constructing	plants	in	Central	Europe	
which	were	effectively	 twins	of	 their	counterparts	 in	Germany,	which	would	
have	been	capable	of	quickly	taking	over	the	production	of	car	models	if	there	
was	no	agreement	with	the	trade	unionists	from	factories	in	Germany.



















































the	next	 few	years	 from	 funding	 to	modernise	 the	energy	 sector,	 such	as	EU	
structural	funds,	the	EU’s	Connecting	Europe	fund,	the	European	Investment	

































































































































electro-mechanical	 industries.	Given	 these	phenomena,	we	 can	 see	 that	 the	
German	logistics	industry	has	been	a	major	beneficiary	of	the	development	of	
infrastructure	in	Central	Europe	financed	by	the	EU’s	cohesion	policy.	






























































































is	 one	 of	 the	 largest	 foreign	 investors;	 it	 is	 the	fifth	 largest	 energy	 supplier	
(6	TWh/year),	and	entered	the	gas	sector	in	2014.	In	Poland,	RWE	has	numer-
ous	wind	farms,	and	via	the	company	RWE	Stoen	Operator	it	controls	1.8%	of	

















the	 largest	 foreign	 investors	 in	 the	 Czech	 Republic,	 employing	 2500	 work-
ers.	E.ON	also	owns	27.6%	of	the	Czech	Republic’s	electricity	networks	(with	
a	 length	of	66,000	km)	and	12.1%	of	the	gas	networks	(with	a	 length	of	8800	































of	 the	energy	network	 (length	37,000	km),	 and	also	has	one	gas-fuelled	and	










































































































































































































































6. The banking sector
The	German	banking	sector	decided	not	 to	participate	 substantially	 in	Cen-
tral	Europe	in	the	1990s;	and	this	situation	has	not	changed	since	the	V4	coun-
tries	joined	the	EU.	The	dominant	shareholders	in	banks	in	Central	Europe	are	
investors	 from	Austria,	 Belgium	 and	 Italy.	 Overall,	 foreign	 banks	maintain	
a	dominant	market	position	in	all	the	V4	countries;	they	own	almost	100%	of	
assets	 in	Slovakia,	 87%	of	 assets	 in	Hungary,	82%	of	 the	assets	 in	 the	Czech	












































country revenue profit before taxes Taxes employment
germany 7392 616 221 38,078
poland 984 441 85 7747
united Kingdom 938 385 19 1369
luxembourg 392 307 12 556
usa 222 127 51 460
china 109 61 7 231
singapore 100 38 -4 342
russia 67 49 10 144
netherlands 38 29 5 40
france 40 17 11 86




mentioning	 that	 this	 financial	 institution	 is	 15%	 controlled	 by	 the	 German	
















43	 The	 CEE	 Banking	 Sector	 Report,	 June	 2015;	 http://www.rbinternational.com/eBusiness/01_
template1/829189266947841370-829189148030934104-1079368060623981396-NA-2-EN.html,	p.	55.
